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MORE FAITH AND CREDIT FOR DIVORCE
DECREES
ROBERT A. LEFLAe
When wise men speak after a long silence, disciples listen attentively.
Oracular ambiguity in the words spoken may gain for them added atten-
tion and even give lesser oracles some business as interpreters of the wise
men's words.
For a quarter of a century the Supreme Court of the United States
has been silent on questions of jurisdiction to grant divorces and the full
faith and credit which under the Federal Constitution must be given to
divorce decrees. Up to 1913, the Court had said enough about these mat-
ters' to make clear that whatever it might say about them would be im-
portant and that it would have more to say. Then came the silence. Finally,
in 1938, the wise men spoke again.
In Davis v. Davis,2 the facts were that a husband had in 1925 secured
a divorce from bed and board at the matrimonial domicile in the District
of Columbia, for the wife's desertion, but had been ordered to pay her
$300 monthly alimony. He later moved to Virginia and sued there for
absolute divorce on the same ground. The wife appeared in the Virginia
action, but only for the purpose of contesting the husband's allegation that
his domicile was in Virginia. This appearance was in the form of a plea
to the court's jurisdiction. The Virginia court heard evidence on the
issue and determined that the husband had a proper domicile in that state,
then granted a stay in the proceedings for a limited time to permit the
wife to take an appeal or enter other pleadings. She did nothing, however,
and in due course a decree of absolute divorce was entered in the hus-
band's favor. This was in 1929. After some intervening proceedings, the
*Professor of Law, University of Arkansas; formerly Visiting Professor
of Law, University of Missouri. A.B., 1922, University of Arkansas; LL.B.,
1927, S.J.D., 1932, Harvard.
1. Particularly in Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562 (1906), and Atherton
v. Atherton, 181 U. S. 155 (1901). Other significant pronouncements were in
Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wall. 108 (U. S. 1869); Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 190(1888); and Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U. S. 14 (1903). The latest case decided
was Thompson v. Thompson, 226 U. S. 551 (1913).
2. 59 Sup. Ct. 3 (1938).
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husband in 1935 brought the present action in the District of Columbia
to set aside the alimony order, relying in part upon the Virginia decree
as entitling him to that relief. The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia affirmed a denial of relief (as far as this ground was concerned)
saying3 that the Virginia decree was not entitled to full faith and credit,
since the last matrimonial domicile of the parties was not in Virginia and
there had been no general appearance by the wife in the Virginia suit.
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, this decision was reversed.
Air. Justice Butler, speaking for a unanimous court, held that the Virginia
decree was absolutely entitled to full faith and credit. Reasons given for
the result were vague and ambiguous. Thus the Delphic oracle invites
lesser oracles to interpret its words, and the tacit invitation goes not un-
heeded.-
To facilitate analysis of the implications of the instant decision, its
background in current authority and theory needs first to be stated in brief
summary.
Domicile is, of course, the primary basis of jurisdiction to grant
divorces. The marital status is deemed to be a res located where the parties
to the status are domiciled, and the divorce proceeding is an action in rem
directed against that res. If both the married parties are domiciled in the
same state, no difficulty arises from this theory. That state is the only
one in which a divorce action is maintainable, and a divorce decree there
granted is entitled to full faith and credit in every other state. *Where
the parties are separated and domiciled in different states, however, the
problem is less simple. Until the decision in Haddock v. Haddock5 was
rendered, it was generally thought that the marital res was such a divisible
one that it was present at the domicile of either of the parties to the mar-
riage, so that a court of either state, on petition of the spouse there
domiciled, could grant a divorce by an in rem proceeding based on statu-
3. Davis v. Davis, 96 F. (2d) 512 (App. D. C. 1938).
4. Apart from the present comment, one full-length article and six law
review notes have already come to this writer's attention. See Strahorn, The
Supreme Court Revisits Haddock (1938) 33 ILL. L. REv. 412; Notes (1939) 24
IOWA L. REv. 365; (1939) 6 U. OF CH. L. Rnv. 290; (1939) 52 HAV. L. RPXV
683; (1939) 25 VA. L. Ruv. 487; (1939) 39 COL. L. REv. 274; (1939) 24 WASH.
U. L. Q. 271. Doubtless several more will follow.
5. 201 U. S. 562 (1906).
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tory service, actual or constructive, on the non-domiciliary spouse. The
Haddock case made it clear that there were some cases in which other
states at least were not required to give full faith and credit to divorce
decrees thus granted at a place which was the domicile of one spouse only,
though it was still established by earlier decisions that such faith and
credit had to be given if the state of the suing party's domicile, thus grant-
ing a decree, were also the last common matrimonial domicile of the
spouses,8 or if the defendant spouse either was served personally or entered
a general appearance in the divorce suit.7 Some authorities took the posi-
tion that these United States Supreme Court holdings under the full faith
and credit clause should also be considered as holdings concerning juris-
diction to grant divorces. The view taken was that if the decree were not
entitled to full faith and credit, it was by the same token invalid as having
been granted by a court lacking jurisdiction." The very rendition of such a
decree, it seems, would have been violative of the due process clause of the
Federal Constitution. This was Professor Beale's view, and by his in-
fluence it was incorporated in the Restatement of Conflict of Laws.0 The
Restatement's only addition to the decided cases already referred to was
the proviso that if the non-domiciliary spouse had consented to the suing
spouse's acquisition of a separate domicile, or had by reason of his miscon-
duct ceased to have the right to object to the acquisition of a separate
domicile by the suing spouse, then the state of separate domicile had
jurisdiction to issue a valid decree which would be absolutely entitled to
full faith and credit elsewhere, just as in the already decided cases. The
effect of the Restatement rule, apart from its identification of jurisdiction
with full faith and credit on the theory that the same decisions applied
equally to both, would be to set up consent to separate domicile and fault
justifying a separate domicile as jurisdictional facts, so that no suit could
be successfully brought for divorce in a state which was the domicile of
the suing spouse only, not the last common matrimonial domicile, and in
which the defendant spouse was not personally subjected to the court's
6. Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U. S. 155 (1901).
7. Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wall. 108 (U. S. 1869).
8. Schofield, The Doctrine of Haddock v. Haddock (1906) 1 ILL. L. Rev.
219; Peaslee, Ex Parte Divorce (1915) 28 HARV. L. REV. 457; Beale, Haddock
Revisited (1926) 39 HARV. L. REV. 417. Also see Strahorn, A Rationale of the
Haddock Case (1938) 32 ILL. L. Ray. 796.
9. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws (1934) § 113, to be read in connec-
tion with § 43, comment g.
[Vol. 4
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jurisdiction, unless such consent or fault were present. Argument for this
rule was made on the ground that it would promote uniformity in the
granting and recognition of divorce decrees.
Promulgation of the Restatement rule excited vigorous opposition.
Many writers felt that the Restatement view would hinder rather than
promote the desired uniformity.10 Basis for this attitude lay in the fact
that many American states were openly committed to the practice of
granting divorces when only the suing spouse was domiciled in the state,
without any consideration of the other jurisdictional facts set out in the
Restatement, and that a majority of the states freely recognized such
divorces as valid without any investigation of the presence or absence of
these so-called jurisdictional facts. Haddock v. Haddock, the case prin-
cipally relied upon as supporting the Restatement view, itself clearly
stated that it was not laying down a rule of jurisdiction or of compulsory
nonrecognition of divorce decrees, but only a rule permitting states under
some circumstances to grant or deny recognition, as they pleased, to extra-
state divorce decrees. It was a holding that full faith and credit need not
be given, not that it could not be given, in such cases. Opponents of the
Restatement rule felt that jurisdiction to grant divorces merely from the
fact of domicile of the suing spouse was apparent from the widespread
practice of granting and recognizing decrees based solely on that fact, plus
the complete absence of authoritative decisions to the contrary, and that
uniformity was more apt to be achieved by encouraging the accepted prac-
tice of recognition of all valid divorces once properly granted than by try-
ing to limit the granting of divorces to the fewer instances in which ex-
trastate recognition was compulsory.
The present writer, in the course of stating more fully in an earlier
article" the reasons for this opposition view, pointed out what appeared to
him to be a serious practical defect in the present law of jurisdiction to
grant divorces. This defect lay in the lack of any genuine assurance of
actual notice and opportunity to defend being given to non-resident de-
fendants in divorce actions. It seemed to him that real notice and oppor-
tunity to defend the pending suit were of vastly greater significance to the
10. Walton, International and Migratory Divorces (1927) 21 ILL. L. REV.
435; McClintock, Fault as an Element of Divorce Jurisdiction (1928) 37 YALE
L. J. 564; Bingham, The American Law Institute v. The Supreme Court in the
Matter of Haddock v. Haddock (1936) 21 CORN. L. Q. 393.
11. Leflar, Jurisdiction to Grant Divorces (1935) 7 Miss. L. J. 445; 4 SE-
LECTED ESSAYS ON CoNsT. LAW (Ass'n of Amer. Law Schools, 1938) 1356.
1939]
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fair and decent administration of justice than was any possible rule con-
cerning the theoretical presence or absence of a theoretical res and the
theoretical submission to the jurisdiction of interests in that res. It
seemed sensible to say that if suit were brought at a place which was the
domicile of one spouse only, the propriety of the local court's exercise
of jurisdiction should be made to depend on the notice given to the absent
spouse, actual notification and real opportunity to defend being in any
event sufficient to justify the exercise of jurisdiction and to require
extrastate recognition of the decree granted.
Analysis of the reasoning employed in Davis v. Davis is not easy, both
because it must be attempted in the light of the remarkable jumble of
theory and precedent just outlined, and because the reasoning itself is far
from being clear and explicit.
In the first place, the case might conceivably have been decided with-
out any necessity for reference to the full faith and credit clause at all.
Since the case came up from the District of Columbia, and since the Su-
preme Court of the United States is the highest court of direct appeal in
the District of Columbia, the Court might have decided the case on the
theory that it was merely determining the rule of comity of the District of
Columbia as to non-compulsory recognition of extrastate divorce decrees. 12
That, however, was not what the Supreme Court said that it was doing;
rather, it put the decision squarely on the compulsory character of the
full faith and credit clause.
One fact upon which the Supreme Court apparently placed some
reliance in reaching its conclusion that the Virginia decree was absolutely
entitled to full faith and credit was that the separation and acquisition
of separate domicile by the husband were due to the wife's fault. Haddock
12. State courts have quite generally applied a rule of comity to allow rec-
ognition to extrastate divorces granted in a state which is the domicile of the
suing plaintiff only, in cases in-which, under Haddock v. Haddock, such recog-
nition was not compulsory. See Gildersleeve v. Gildersleeve, 88 Conn. 689, 92
Atl. 684 (1914); Holdorf v. Holdorf, 198 Iowa 158, 197 N. W. 910 (1924);
Miller v. Miller, 89 Kan. 151, 130 Pac. 681 (1913); Howey v. Howey, 240 S.
W. 450 (Mo. 1922); Toncray v. Toncray, 123 Tenn. 476, 131 S. W. 977 (1910),
34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1106 (1911). Even New York regularly recognizes extrastate
divorce decrees in some circumstances in which the Haddock case itself would not
require recognition. Ball v. Cross, 231 N. Y. 329, 132 N. E. 106 (1921). Cf.
Dean v. Dean, 241 N. Y. 240, 149 N. E. 844 (1925), 42 A. L. R. 1398 (1926).
See Greene, The Enforcement of a Foreign Divorce Decree in New York (1926)
11 CoRN. L. Q. 141, 160. The Missouri cases are.collected and carefully analyzed
in a Comment entitled "Validity of Foreign Divorces in Missouri" in (1937) 2
Mo. L. Rav. 193.
[Vol. 4
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v. Haddock was expressly distinguished on the ground that in that ease
the wife was wholly without fault, giving her husband no justification for
abandoning her and establishing a separate domicile in Connecticut. This
undoubtedly gives a strong hint of future acceptance of the Beale-Restate-
ment view 3 that "fault" in the non-domiciliary defendant spouse is an
important factor in such cases, as far as compulsory recognition is con-
cerned. But it is not a hint that the Court is inclined to consider "fault"
as a jurisdictional fact; there is nothing whatever in the decision to in-
dicate that the Court thought the wife's fault was essential to the Virginia
court's jurisdiction to hear and pass on the merits of the case, nor essential
to any other court's power to grant voluntary recognition to the Virginia
decree if it should choose to do so.
The other facts upon which the Court principally relied in its opinion
in the Dcvis case were the wife's appearance in the Virginia proceeding for
the purpose of contesting the husband's allegation of a Virginia domicile,
and the subsequent stay of proceedings apparently granted to enable her
to make a defense on the merits. These were treated as the equivalent of
a general appearance1 4 which, under the rule of an older decision,1 5 sufficed
to satisfy the requirements of the full faith and credit clause. If the
facts were such as actually to constitute a general appearance according to
the accepted meaning of the term, they would afford an easy explanation of
the case, but few states other than Texas' 6 would deem them to constitute
anything other than a special appearance by way of plea to the juris-
diction. Perhaps the case should be taken as a holding that such a limited
appearance as this, at a place found to be the domicile of the plaintiff
spouse, is enough to satisfy the full faith and credit clause.
13. Supra, notes 8 and 9.
14. "If the plea alone may not be held to amount to a general appearance,
there arises the question whether, by her participation in the litigation and
acquiescence in the orders of the court relating to merits, she submitted herself
to its jurisdiction for all purposes. Her plea and conduct are to be considered
together. . . . Plainly her plea and conduct in the Virginia court cannot be
regarded as special appearance merely to challenge jurisdiction. Considered in
its entirety, the record shows that she submitted herself to the jurisdiction of
the Virginia court and is bound by its determination that it had jurisdiction
of the subject matter and of the parties." Butler, J., 59 Sup. Ct. 7, 8 (1938).
15. Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wall. 108 (U. S. 1869).
16. In York v. Texas, 137 U. S. 15 (1890), it was held- that a Texas statute
declaring that any appearance whatever even for the purpose merely of con-
testing the court's jurisdiction, should have the effect of a general appearance,
was valid and not violative of due process of law. It does not appear, however,
that the law of Virginia gave any such effect to an appearance for purposes of
pleading to the jurisdiction.
1939]
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One respect in which the decision is actually illuminating is as to the
conclusive effect of a court's finding of its own jurisdiction after the issue
has been litigated before it. From time immemorial it has been said that
a judgment rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction is a nullity, and that
a court's finding of its own jurisdiction in a case before it is always open
to collateral attack.'17  This statement has been made whether the juris-
diction in question was over the person of the defendant in an action in
personam, or over the res proceeded against in an action in ren, or over the
subject matter of the suit in any kind of action. But in recent years there
has been an increasing tendency in the courts to apply common law prin-
ciples of res judicata, or even the constitutional requirement of full faith
and credit, to adjudications of the jurisdictional issue.18 Thus in Baldwin
v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Assn,19 which was relied upon in Davis
v. Davis, the United States Supreme Court held that a finding of personal
jurisdiction over a defendant, after litigation of the issue, in a federal court
of one state rendered the issue of jurisdiction res judicata so that the first
court's finding was immune from collateral attack in a federal court of
another state. It is true that the Supreme Court pointed out that the
full faith and credit clause was "not involved, since neither of the courts
concerned was a state court," but the step from res judicata to full faith
and credit is a short one and is furthermore a step in the direction in
which the Court appears inclined to travel. Certain it is that a defend-
ant who appears even specially to contest the court's jurisdiction and
for no other purpose has been held thereby to subject himself to the court's
jurisdiction insofar as the due process of law requirements of the Federal
Constitution are concerned,2" so that the due process clause probably can-
not be the basis of collateral attack on such judgment in any event.21
17. See Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall. 457 (U. S. 1873).
18. Discussions of the problem appear in Medina, Conclusiveness of Rul-
ings on Jurisdiction (1931) 31 CoL. L. RaV. 238; Gavit, Jurisdiction of the
Subject Matter and Res Judicata (1932) 80 U. OF PA. L. REV. 386; Farrier,
Full Faith and Credit of Adjudication of Jurisdictional Facts (1935) 2 U. OF
Cmi. L. Ray. 552. Also see Note (1939) 6 U. oF CH. L. Ray. 293.
19. .283 U. S. 522 (1931).
20. York v. Texas, 137 U. S. 15 (1890).
21. In Farrier, lo. cit. supra, note 18, the position is taken that if juris-
diction be present in the due process of law sense, as it is whenever there has
been an appearance by the defendant even for the purpose of contesting the ju-
risdiction only, then a collateral attack upon the jurisdiction is bound to be un-
successful, since there could be no lack of jurisdiction when the court acquiredjurisdiction by the very fact of the admitted appearance, even though the court's
finding of its own jurisdiction purported to be based on some other and possibly
[Vol.
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Though it is undoubtedly true that the mere fact that a judgment as ren-
dered complies with the requirements of the due process clause does not
automatically entitle it to the protections of the full faith and credit
clause,22 it is also true that this fact puts the judgment in a position in
which it is easily possible for the Supreme Court to hold, when the ques-
tion is squarely presented, that it is entitled to full faith and credit.
In Davis v. Davis, the husband's domicile in Virginia was a jurisdic-
tional fact absolutely essential to the presence in Virginia of the marital
status which was the res against which the divorce suit, as an in rem
proceeding, was directed. Without it, the Virginia court would simply
have lacked jurisdiction even in the due process of law sense.23 As an
extrinsic fact, the husband may or may not'have been domiciled in Vir-
ginia; we simply do not know. What we do know is that the United
States Supreme Court said that the Virginia court, after litigation of the
issue, had conclusively decided it. "Plainly, the determination of the
decree upon that point is effective for all purposes in this litigation," said
Mr. Justice Butler. This is not a holding that a court's finding of its
own jurisdiction over the person of a defendant, or even of its own juris-
diction over a tangible res which is the subject of an in rem proceeding
before it, is entitled to full faith and credit when the jurisdictional facts
have been affirmatively determined after litigation, but it is a holding
which furnishes ready and sensible analogy for such further holdings.2"
invalid ground. One possible defect in this reasoning lies in the fact that
York v. Texas, upon which the reasoning relies, arose from Texas where a
statute expressly gave general jurisdiction by reason of any appearance what-
ever. Under this statutory rule, defendants not previously subject to the court's
jurisdiction would presumably know better than to appear. But if a state has
no such rule of law concerning appearances, parties appearing specially would
not properly expect to be held to be appearing generally. York v. Texas does
not actually hold that such a result may validly be imposed upon a defendant
without any -warning whatever.
22. This is the case of so-called "non-conclusive jurisdiction". Leflar, Ju-
risdiction to Grant Divorces (1935) 7 MIss. L. J. 445, 464; 4 SELECTED ESSAYS
ON CONsT. LAW (Ass'n of Amer. Law Schools, 1938) 1356, 1375. Also see
Medina, Conclusiveness of Rulings on Jurisdiction (1931) 31 CoL. L. REv. 238,241. 23. Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U. S. 14 (1903).
24. In Stoll v. Gottlieb, 59 Sup. Ct. 134 (1938), which was decided just
two weeks after the Davis case, the decision in Davis v. Davis itself was cited
in support of a holding that a court's finding of its own jurisdiction over sub-ject matter, after litigation of the point, was conclusive as against collateral




Missouri Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 3 [1939], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol4/iss3/2
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
The background for such ultimate holdings has at least been well laid."
The Davis case, taken by itself, is certainly an inconclusive decision.
It may be taken as marking a trend toward either or all of the theories
that are set out in it, or merely an unwillingness to extend the rigorously
harsh rule of Haddock v. Haddock beyond the fact situations actually
covered by it, or it may mark the beginning of a re-examination of the
whole basis for divorce jurisdiction in the states. The latter possibility
is one which social-minded lawyers and laymen alike should be happy to
see pursued, since there are few important areas of the law more thoroughly
confused, both in respect to what the law is and in respect to divergence
between theory and practice in the courts, than that which deals with
jurisdiction to grant divorces and the extrastate recognition of divorces once
granted. If such a complete re-examination of basic principles should be in
the offing, it may be sincerely hoped that greater weight than heretofore
will be accorded to assurance to non-domiciliary spouses of notice and fair
opportunity to defend suits brought against them. Judges and authors
may write learned page on page till tomes are filled with pure theory
concerning the situs of an imagined res, yet say not one word about those
substantial interests which the due process clause is designed to defend.
All the nice philosophizing ever penned concerning acts and non-acts
which unwittingly submit a spouse's interests in a technical res to the
jurisdiction of this state or that contain not one whit of assurance that the
spouse will know about a divorce suit when it is brought and have a fair
chance to protect himself against the judicial destruction of those sub-
stantial interests which most spouses have in their own marital relation-
ships. Whatever may be said in abstract theory, the clear fact remains
that the marital status which is said to be a res present, at least sometimes,
where either spouse is domiciled, is not like a cow or a tract of land or even
a chose in action. Each of these is of such a nature that the bringing of
suit against the res, without more, has some tendency toward notification.
If there be garnishment of a chose in action, the garnishee as a disinterested
party is almost certain to notify the defendant; if the proceeding be against
25. Intermittently, over a period of several years, Professor T. E. Atkin-
son, now of the law faculty of the University of Missouri, has urged upon this
writer a view favoring finality for adjudications of jurisdiction as for adjudica-
tions of other litigated issues. Blind adherence to the dogma that jurisdic-
tional findings are always subject to collateral attack induced opposition to
Professor Atkinson's intelligent attitude. But the force of reason and authority
combined now promises soon to become overwhelming.
[Vol. 4
9
Leflar: Leflar: More Faith and Credit for Divorce Decrees
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1939
MORE FAITH FOR DIVORCE DECREES
a tangible res the very seizure of the thing itself serves to give notice.
But when the action is against the marital res there is no disinterested third
party under a substantial obligation to see that real notice is given nor is
there any tangible thing to be seized. Too often in fact it is the design
of the suing spouse to prevent the absent spouse from having an actual
opportunity to defend on the merits. It seems that the requirements of
due process of law might better be stated in terms of affording good
notice and substantial opportunity to defend rather than in terms of
prior conduct or misconduct deemed to constitute submission of interests in
the marital res to an as yet unselected jurisdiction.
The decision in Davis v. Davis is definitefy in keeping with this pos-
sibility. In this case the defendant wife did actually appear in the Virginia
suit, a suit brought in a forum only a few miles from her own home, and
in which she was given every opportunity, even to the extent of a stay
in the proceedings, to make her defense on the merits. The guaranty of
protection against unfair deprivations which the due process clause is
supposed to assure was amply enforced. If any usual element in such
cases was lacking it was unsubstantial. All this assurance in the first suit
of protection to every substantial interest of the defendant simply leaves
no excuse whatever for trying the case over again. Explanation of the
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